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Abstract
Dynamic tolls present an opportunity for municipalities to eliminate congestion and fund
infrastructure. Imposing tolls that regulate travel along a public highway through monetary fees
raise worries of inequity. In this article, we introduce the concept of time poverty, emphasize
its value in policy-making in the same ways income poverty is already considered, and argue
the potential equity concern posed by time-varying tolls that produce time poverty. We also
compare the cost burdens of a no-toll, system optimal toll, and a proposed “time-equitable” toll
on heterogeneous traveler groups using an analytical Vickrey bottleneck model where travelers
make departure time decisions to arrive at their destination at a fixed time. We show that
the time-equitable toll is able to eliminate congestion while creating equitable travel patterns
amongst traveler groups.
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1 Introduction
Congestion pricing is a commonly used mechanism for relieving congestion on a roadway along
with generating revenue for infrastructure projects. Peak-period congestion pricing, commonly
implemented using dynamically priced toll lanes and cordon tolls, charges higher prices for travelers
in the middle of the peak period. The intent is to force travelers to more explicitly consider the
cost of travel and may choose to shift the time of travel for trips that are less important.
Contemporary research on the dynamic pricing of toll roads has largely been concentrated on their
ability to effectively relieve congestion, improve environmental pollution measures, and maximize
profits for the road operator. For example, cordon tolls in Sweden have reduced congestion by
22% and enjoy widespread public support (Sørensen et al., 2014). Similarly, a survey of European
congestion tolls saw 14% and 23% decreases in vehicle counts in Milan and Bologna; 30% and 33%
decreases in delay times in London and Stockholm; 13-21% reduction in CO2 emissions in Stockholm
and Rome; and a 14% decline in collision rates in Milan (May et al., 2009). These effects are
predictable and reproducible across a wide variety of contexts, because consumer elasticity towards
tolls has been found to stably vary between −0.2 and −0.8 across a wide variety of research (Gifford
and Talkington, 1996; Hirschman et al., 1995; Jones and Hervik, 1992; Odeck and Br˚athen, 2008;
Ribas et al., 1988; White, 1984; Wuestefeld and Regan III, 1981).
Although dynamic tolls have succeeded in reducing congestion, they raise other worries including
inequity. Real world practitioners are keenly aware of the equity pitfalls congestion tolls present.
One position is that equity concerns are a purely public relations (Wang et al., 2012) or an educa-
tion (Giuliano, 1992) problem. Commonly recommended solutions to increase support for toll roads
and assuage worries over equity include allocating toll revenues to projects that visibly increase
equity, using the revenues for subsidizing public transit, or evenly distributing revenues amongst
travelers as a substitution for gasoline or other sales taxes (Small, 1992).
While some equity concerns can be addressed through public outreach, in this article we argue
that inequity should be addressed more directly in the design of dynamic tolls. Commonly used
dynamic tolls are designed for system optimal efficiency. Such tolls minimize the total cost incurred
in the system by charging a dynamic toll that applies uniformly to all travelers. A uniform toll
predicates access to roads at peak periods on one’s ability to pay and decreases the likelihood that
poorer travelers will choose to travel at peak periods. However, if nondiscriminatory access to
public roads is a public good, then this observation is a prima facie, though defeasible, case against
system optimal tolls. In addition, research on time poverty by sociologists raises worries that there
are significant harms to low-income travelers associated with being segregated to off peak travel
over and above any concerns raised about the monetary costs of the tolls.
Consider a small motivating example. Suppose there are two travelers, X and Y, who want to arrive
at the same destination at the same time and must pass through the same bottleneck. Traveler X
receives a penalty of 10 money units for arriving late, while traveler Y receives a penalty of 9 money
units for the same. The operator at the bottleneck has to decide who goes through the bottleneck
first; the traveler going first arrives on time and incurs no penalty, while the other traveler incurs
a penalty. A system optimal solution considers travelers’ absolute costs and selects an order than
minimizes the total system cost: traveler X goes first, while traveler Y waits and pays a penalty of
9 units. However, traveler X is rich and owns 100 units of money, while traveler 2 is poor and owns
30 units of money. The relative penalty for arriving late is 10% of the current worth for traveler X,
while it is 30% for traveler Y. Under the system optimal solution traveler Y ends up significantly
worse off as they end up losing 30% of their worth.
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This example, though not a precise analog to dynamic tolling, carries the key essence of our
argument: equity issues arise when a traveler’s relative worth of time is ignored. A system optimal
toll, that values travelers based on their absolute willingness to pay, may minimize cost for the whole
system, but it can also increase the equity gap across the population leaving the poor travelers
worse off. Considerations of equity show that the assumption about tolling based on absolute
willingness to pay should be challenged. In particular, research into time poverty shows that
poorer travelers already have to substitute their time for goods/service out of their price range. This
article brings together a discussion on toll schemes, equity, and time poverty within transportation
policy. Although the literature has discussed all three of these issues and even brought some of
them together (see Akamatsu and Wada, 2017; Arnott et al., 1987; Lindsey, 2004; Litman, 1996),
there has been no sustained discussion of how transportation policies can exacerbate or ameliorate
inequitable distributions of time poverty.
In this article, we analyze the issue of time poverty for dynamic tolls imposed over a single bottleneck
that a group of travelers use in order to arrive at their destination at a given time. First, we show
that equity concerns in transportation are primarily rooted in a desire to respect all travelers
equally and that time poverty ought to be considered in policy-making in the same ways that
income poverty already is. We argue that tolling schemes that produce time-poverty among poorer
travelers ought to be examined as a potential equity concern. Second, we extend the qualitative
equity investigation to a particular implementation of a time-varying toll on single bottlenecks to
examine whether it raises equity concerns. We also propose an alternative, which we call a time-
equitable toll, that eliminates congestion while creating equitable travel patterns amongst traveler
groups by charging different rates for different groups.
The primary contributions of this article are two-fold: (a) we conduct an equity analysis of the
system optimal dynamic toll highlighting the importance of equity for time as a resource, and (b) we
develop a time-equitable tolling scheme and show how it addresses these inequities. The rest of the
article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of equity in the context of transportation
systems and introduces the idea of time poverty. Section 3 discusses some of the preliminary ideas
from Vickrey’s bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1969). Section 4 defines the time-equitable tolls and
proves its efficiency relative to a system-optimal toll. Section 5 presents numerical results and
Section 6 concludes the article and provides directions for future work.
2 Equity and Time Poverty: Literature Review
In this section, we present how equity is defined and discussed for toll roads in the literature. We
also show the need for including time poverty in the discussions surrounding equity, which in the
context of transportation systems means arriving to work on time and not being forced to leave
early to avoid tolls.
2.1 Equity concerns for toll roads
Given the complexities of real world policies, their unpredictable interactions, and the way support
for policies in one arena motivate our preferences in others, judgments about the equity impacts of
a particular policy are often unclear and uncertain. Litman (2012) provides a simpler definition as
follows:
Definition 1 (Equitable policies (Litman, 2012)) An equitable policy is the one that fairly allocates
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its costs and benefits.
This definition requires estimating costs and benefits across different social groups, which is a
difficult task. There are three diverse conceptions of equity in the transportation sector based on
how the perceived cost and benefits are allocated (Litman, 2012).
1. Horizontal equity: A policy exhibits horizontal equity when its costs and benefits are
distributed strictly by cost or need. The goal is perfectly equal treatment; individuals subject
to the policy should receive equal benefits, pay equal costs, and be treated in a procedurally
identical manner. Example policies include the allocation of one vote to each person, and
movements to ensure that local property taxes are spent on local projects.
2. Vertical equity with regard to demography or income: Vertically equitable policies
distribute their costs and benefits with a sensitivity to the distribution of impacts between
groups that differ with respect to income, social class, race, or some other identifiable distinc-
tion. Transport policies may be vertically equitable if they favor disadvantaged groups in a
manner that compensates for structural inequalities in the larger society (Rawls, 2009). For
example, vertically equitable transit policies may call for higher levels of service to poorer
neighborhoods in recognition of the fact that many residents lack alternative transport modes.
3. Vertical equity with regard to mobility need and ability: A second variety of vertically
equitable policies focuses on the different ways differing mobility needs and abilities change
access to social goods. Policies under this aspect of equity include universal design such as
curb cuts for wheelchairs, audible beacons for crosswalks, or wheelchair ramps on kneeling
buses.
This raises the question of which conceptions of equity are best suited to address dynamic tolls?
Before proposing an answer, we review equity concerns for toll roads in the literature.
Equity arguments against toll roads Tolls roads have long been accused of increasing inequity
in a number of ways. Toll roads charge a financial cost for accessing a facility and impose burden
on travelers in three ways. First, and most obviously, toll roads impose financial burden on poor
travelers. Harvey (1991) and Giuliano (1992) note that tolls create winners and losers and do
not lead to a Pareto improvement as workers in areas with poor transit are highly likely to pay
bridge tolls at peak hours because they lack alternatives. Second, toll roads create environmental
costs and congestion in poorer neighborhoods when travelers choose to use local roads in order to
avoid the toll. For example, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 2007 plan to institute a
congestion charge in lower Manhattan was opposed, as it was shown that the funds raised would
largely come from lower-middle class families (Taylor and Kalauskas, 2010). Last, toll roads limit
access to transportation facilities for poor travelers. Often dynamic tolling systems work best with
cashless transactions, but poorer travelers are less likely than affluent travelers to have credit cards
or bank accounts, which makes it both more difficult and more expensive to access facilities with
electronic tolling systems (Plotnick et al., 2009). Similarly, many poor travelers face constrained
schedules that effectively force them to travel at peak periods. For instance, single mothers must
pick up and drop their kids off in narrow windows, and therefore avoid nonstandard working hours
if at all possible (Presser, 1995).
Equity arguments in favor of toll roads Despite the concerns about the inequitable impact of
toll roads, some researchers have argued that tolls do not have a uniform impact on equity because
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their effect on the road network is highly sensitive to the specifics of the proposed plan, particularly
its price structure, quality of alternatives, use of raised revenues, and whether driving is a luxury
or a necessity, i.e. whether transit or routes that avoid the toll are available (see Golub, 2010;
Litman, 1996, 2012; Raje´, 2003; Santos and Rojey, 2004; Schweitzer, 2009). These authors concede
that particular implementations of time-varying tolls may have regressive income effects, but argue
that tolls can also be fine-tuned to have progressive outcomes. For example, express lane facilities
provide a non-tolled alternative and are claimed to be more equitable than standard toll roads by
providing a congestion-free alternative for urgent trips for a moderate fees (FHWA, 2020).
Additionally, other researchers have argued that the equity implications of a time-varying toll
are entirely dependent on the alternative methods available for funding transportation projects.
Unfortunately, the commonly used alternative — a sales tax — is regressively inequitable in itself
due to three reasons. First, user fees are regressive by nature; poorer travelers have less money
and so $1 in tax to them represents more of their income than a $1 tax would represent for
wealthier travelers. Second, the poor are also the most likely to own older and less fuel-efficient
vehicles. They spend more money (which is a larger percentage of their income) to go fewer miles, a
disparity that holds for all travel, not just for the most congested travel. Last, poorer travelers tend
to live in the urban core and drive less frequently, so area-wide sales taxes tend to force them to
subsidize infrastructure that they do not use. Thus, non-discriminating sales taxes pose problems
for horizontal equity among travelers.
These arguments suggest that financing transportation projects using tolls as a revenue stream is
a viable option, and provided the toll implementation addresses the social inequalities, it can be
an equitable alternative to using sales tax. In fact, there are mechanisms to implement tolls that
benefit the poor. A Florida study examining strategies to decrease vehicle miles traveled found
that a tradeable credit scheme would benefit low-income households because they would be able
to trade away their credits and so receive compensation for traveling less (Mamun et al., 2016). A
version of the tradeable credit scheme was also implemented in Minnesota with some success. The
state toll road authority, MnPass, credited every account with a positive balance that could be used
and supplemented with a user’s funds. If a user chose not to travel on toll lanes, however, the funds
could be applied towards registration fees, a cost savings that would benefit all drivers (Taylor and
Kalauskas, 2010).
In this article, we are most concerned with whether such a time-varying toll ought to be implemented
in a horizontally equitable manner (that is, the only determinant of access is one’s willingness and
ability to pay the toll) or whether there are identifiable socioeconomic groups that, for a reason
we will need to articulate, ought to receive a subsidy on their travel relative to the general public.
While there are many interesting research questions into how we might devise a tolling scheme that
addresses Litmans third kind of equity or even racial inequities, we only focus on parameters of the
Vickrey bottleneck that are most clearly applied to income and socio-economic status.
2.2 Justifying vertically-equitable tolls
The toll policies proposed in the literature commonly assume, implicitly or explicitly, a particular
theory of value, viz. “system optimal efficiency” where the goal is to minimize total cost in the
system. This theory of value says that willingness to pay should be used as a way of sorting who
has the right to travel at a given time. However, minimizing costs is not guaranteed to be most
equitable in terms of fairly distributing the costs and benefits. (See the example in Section 1.)
Another commonly-used objective for toll policies is revenue maximization; however, even revenue-
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maximizing tolls can have unintended consequences, creating differential impact on different groups.
For example, maximizing revenue on express lane facilities promotes “jam-and-harvest” strategies
where it is in the toll operator’s best interest to increase congestion on the regular lanes in the early
peak period to harvest more revenue towards the latter period (Go¨c¸men et al., 2015; Pandey and
Boyles, 2018). Additionally, jam-and-harvest increases costs on poor travelers in favor of reducing
costs for wealthier travelers.
When we consider a potential policy, we can ask of it: “Does this policy show equal respect to all
citizens?” In cases where horizontal equity is the primary social good, we judge that the citizens
are on an equal playing field, therefore we show them equal respect by treating everyone in the
same manner. In cases where vertical equity is important, we judge that citizens are not on an
equal playing field and so we show them equal respect by ensuring that the least advantaged receive
compensatory benefits that allow them to access or compete for social and economic goods from
which they would otherwise be shut out.1
Developing equitable tolling policies is challenging due to the difficulty in defining when citizens
are on equal playing fields. However, in cases where we do observe systematic inequalities, such
as the differential treatment of groups due to the system-optimal or revenue-maximizing tolls, a
vertically-equitable toll is justified and ought to be considered.
2.3 Introducing time poverty analysis
Time poverty should be included in equity analysis because it has the same importance to travelers
as unfairly distributed economic costs. First, low-income travelers experience poverty both with
respect to money but also with respect to their time. Second, time poverty creates concerns
that low-income travelers will be excluded from primary social goods. Third, the socially optimal
dynamic tolling plan exacerbates these problems. Therefore, the dynamic tolling plan creates equity
concerns and we should examine alternatives that mitigate this issue.
The concepts of time-poverty are not new. Vickery (1977) argued that measurements of poverty
based solely upon household income miss an important aspect of poverty, namely that the time
to fulfill basic household needs increases as income decreases. One definition of time poverty is
presented in Bardasi and Wodon (2006).
Definition 2 (Time poverty, Bardasi and Wodon, 2006) “Conceptually, time poverty can be
understood as the fact that some individuals do not have enough time for rest and leisure after
taking into account the time spent working, whether in the labor market, for domestic work, or for
other activities such as commuting.”
Families that do not fall into the income definition of poverty can still experience time poverty. This
is because even when extreme want is out of the equation, time poverty is a problem driven by the
number of hours worked, when they are worked, and the physical intensity of that work (Warren,
2003). Higher paid workers can control when they work, where they work, and have more flexibility
to take time off, which creates greater job satisfaction, lowers stress levels, and creates work-life
balance (Doyle and Reeves, 2001). Moving up the socio-economic scale also allows people to “buy
back” their time by paying others to do domestic chores (Gregson and Lowe, 2005; Roberts, 1998;
Stephens, 1999).
1This article is an inappropriate forum to describe all of the debates that have taken place in the philosophical
literature regarding equity and justice. We refer the reader to the work by Rawls (2009) and Chapter 2 of Helsel
(2017).
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Although the literature covers a wide variety of perspectives, the discussion of time poverty has often
been framed as a problem facing female managers as they struggle to balance long and demanding
workdays with the traditional responsibilities of a homemaker (Rutherford, 2001). But this focus
on the upper-middle class and corporate executives misses the crucial experience of millions of
low-income families. As families move out of monetary poverty, they can find themselves suddenly
time poor. For instance, 50–60% of unemployed single parents are below the monetary poverty
threshold, but only 3% are time poor (Harvey and Mukhopadhyay, 2007). When single parents are
employed only 26–31% are monetarily poor, but 98% are time poor. Only 5.3% of single parents
are neither time nor monetarily poor. Even a partner to share the load is not a panacea, since
20–30% of employed two-parent families are still time poor (they work above the threshold of 11.5
hours per day per parent).
We argue that time poverty ought to be a central focus of our equity evaluation because time is
one of the most precious goods humans possess. Intrinsically, free time provides an opportunity
for rest, social interaction, leisure participation, and self-realization, which makes it an important
non-monetary welfare resource (Chatzitheochari and Arber, 2012). Philosophers, economists, and
social theorists have consistently conceptualized free time as a primary good for individual well-
being (Blackden and Wodon, 2006; Marx and Engels, 1968). This right is so fundamental that it
is recognized in a number of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (United Nations, 1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (United Nations Human Rights, 1966). These political documents recognize the fact that
human beings work in order to participate in those activities and to be with those people who make
life interesting and fun.
The principle that equitable policies show equal respect for all citizens (Rawls, 2009) helps us to
understand why time as good should be shared by all citizens and not just the wealthy. In context
of time-varying tolls this is a key concern where the commonly used system optimal objective can
have unintended consequences of penalizing relatively time poor travelers. In the next section, we
highlight the case where dynamic tolling for single bottlenecks poses concerns of time equity and
propose a vertically-equitable toll to address this inequity.
3 Preliminaries: Vickrey’s Bottleneck Model
In this section we introduce the multiclass Vickreys bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1969). The simplest
version of this model includes a single link between the origin and the destination. The link has an
unlimited capacity before and after the bottleneck, but at the bottleneck the capacity is limited.
(This capacity assumption mimics a point queue model in dynamic traffic assignment.) Vickrey’s
model is useful as it offers insights into “the nature of time-of-day shifts, various inefficiencies in
unpriced equilibria, the temporal pattern of optimal pricing, and some surprising effects of pricing
on travel patterns and travel costs.” (Small, 2015). Positioning this article among the variants
of Vickrey’s model, we label the specific assumptions as A#. Through the rest of the article, we
assume vehicles have single occupancy, and use travelers and vehicles interchangeably (A#1).
3.1 Notations and assumptions
Trips along the Vickrey’s bottleneck model have five stages: a departure, a free flow period to
the bottleneck, a congested phase while waiting for prior vehicles to pass the bottleneck, passing
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the bottleneck, and an arrival. The simplest version of the model takes three inputs: number of
travelers (N), a fixed rate of discharge at the bottleneck in vehicles per time unit (D), and a desired
arrival time at the destination for all vehicles (τ∗). We assume inelastic demand, fixed capacity,
and a fixed desired time of arrival for all vehicles to simplify our analyses (A#2). This assumption
allows us to focus our analysis on equity as clearly as possible.
All travelers possess a value of time (expressed as money units per time unit), which represents
the perceived cost of a unit of time spent traveling or waiting in a queue. Travelers also have
schedule delay penalties for early and late arrival. In the commuting case, these penalties are
influenced by whether the worker has a flexible schedule that permits them to be productive before
the desired start time, the magnitude of penalties the worker faces for arriving late, and other
schedule constraints that may make it costly for the worker to arrive before or after their start time
(for example, convenience charges by childcare services to drop a child off early).
Travelers are assumed to belong to different heterogeneous groups with varying values of time and
schedule delay penalties (A#3). Modeling continuous distributions of parameters requires solutions
to nonlinear differential equations (Arnott et al., 1990) and is left as part of the future work. Let
K denote the set of all groups, and αk, βk, and γk (respectively) denote the value of time, the early
arrival penalty, and the late arrival penalty, for a traveler in group k ∈ K.
Let τ(t) denote the destination arrival time of a traveler departing from the origin at time t. Because
each group contains more than one traveler, let nk(t) denote the departure rate of group k at time
t and Nk denote the total number of travelers in group k. Further, define n(t) =
∑
k∈K nk(t) as the
total number of travelers departing at time t. While the physical interpretation of such a model
requires that vehicles be discrete entities, we assume infinitely divisible travelers over a continuous
time to facilitate analysis (A#4).
The utility of each traveler in group k departing at time t is captured in a cost function, cktotal(t),
which is composed of four distinct costs: the cost (determined by αk) of the time required to travel
from the origin to the destination in free flow conditions, ckFF(t); the cost of the time required to
wait in any queue at the bottleneck, ckqueue(t); the schedule delay cost (determined by βk and γk)
created by arriving at the destination at a time other than the desired arrival time, ckSD(t); and,
the direct cost of a toll that is imposed, cktoll(t). Each of these costs can vary over the peak hour
and it is possible for some of these costs to be equal to 0.
Without loss of generality, we set ckFF(t) = 0 for all t and k ∈ K. A constant free flow term merely
adds a constant term to all of the cases in our analysis, which does not affect comparisons across
alternative toll schemes. Let SDCk, TTCk, TRCk, and TCk be the schedule delay cost, travel time
cost, toll rate cost, and total cost across all travelers in group k. Without the subscript, let each
of these terms represents the total of the cost across all groups. That is, SDC =
∑
k∈K SDCk,
TTC =
∑
k∈K TTCk, TRC =
∑
k∈K TRCk, and TC =
∑
k∈K TCk. Later in the text, we will use
a superscript on the cost terms to differentiate costs for different toll scenarios.
Several basic relations hold among the defined variables. First, Equation (3.1) evaluates arrival
time τ(t) by adding the time spent in the queue to the departure time:
τ(t) = t+
q(t)
D
, (3.1)
where q(t) is the queue length at time t. Second, flow conservation requires that the rate of change
of the number of vehicles in a queue is equal to the difference between the inflow rate and the
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outflow rate. Mathematically,
dq(t)
dt
= n(t)−D. (3.2)
Equation (3.2) holds only when the bottleneck is active, that is n(t) ≥ D. Next, the expressions for
cost terms can be evaluated. We assume that ckqueue(t) is derived from a model of a deterministic
queue (A#5), that is, the queue delay is evaluated as:
ckqueue(t) = αk.
q(t)
D
. (3.3)
The schedule delay cost distinguishes the two cases of early or late arrival and is expressed a
maximum between the two terms in Equation (3.4). As an extension of assumption A#2, τ∗ is
same across all groups.
ckSD(t) = max {βk (τ∗ − τ(t)) , γk (τ(t)− τ∗)} . (3.4)
We model travelers as purely rational and selfish, that is, each traveler wants to minimize her
own total cost (A#6). Thus, the choice of departure time for each traveler can be modeled as
a non-cooperative game among non-atomic travelers and the steady-state behavior of the game
is considered. Lindsey (2004) defines the deterministic departure-time user equilibrium as the
following:
Definition 3 (Deterministic departure-time user equilibrium) At equilibrium, all travelers in a
group incur the same trip cost for their chosen departure times, and equal or higher costs at any
other times.
Because the arrival times are uniquely determined by the departure time, the trip cost for all
travelers in a group are also same as a function of arrival times. If we assume that αk > βk for
each group (A#7)2, and given that the linear schedule delay cost functions in Equation (3.4) are
continuous, finite, and evaluate to zero for τ(t) = τ∗ for each group k, the equilibrium departure
time distribution for each group exists and is unique (Lindsey, 2004, Propositions 1 and 2). The
equilibrium departure time distributions can be found by solving a mixed linear complementarity
problem using algorithms like Lemke’s (Ramadurai et al., 2010).
In this article, we make additional assumptions that help us derive analytical formulas for the
equilibrium, obviating the need for mixed linear complementarity formulations. First, we limit our
attention to two groups. This can be done without loss of generality as the formulas in the following
sections can be easily extended for three or more travel groups. Second, as others have assumed
in the literature (Arnott et al., 1987, 1990; Henderson, 1981), we assume that the ratio of late and
early arrival penalties are constant for both groups (A#8). That is, γ1/β1 = γ2/β2 = η, where η is
a fixed constant greater than 1.
Next, we classify the groups based on the absolute and relative values of α and β. The value of
α is typically proportional to the income level of a class, thus we call travelers with higher α as
high-income travelers. A lower value of β for a group (and equivalently a low value of γ) implies
that the group is more flexible in their schedule than travelers with higher value of β. Thus, we
call travelers with lower value of β (or γ) as absolutely time-flexible travelers with higher absolute
2This is a reasonable assumption because if αk < βk, then we would be modeling travelers who derive more benefit
from waiting in traffic than arriving early to do paperwork or even sitting in the company parking lot. The empirical
findings in Small (1982) also support this assumption.
9
Table 1: Characterizing travelers based on absolute and relative values of α and β
Characteristics Label
High value of α High-income travelers
Low value of β (or γ) Absolutely time-flexible travelers
Low value of β/α Relatively time-flexible travelers
Example usages:
1) Group 1 is absolutely less time-flexible than group 2 meaning β1 > β2
2) Group 1 is relatively less time-flexible than group 2 meaning β1/α1 > β2/α2
3) Group 1 is relatively as time-flexible as group 2 meaning β1/α1 = β2/α2
4) Group 1 is absolutely more time-flexible but relatively less time-flexible
than group 2 meaning β1 < β2 but β1/α1 > β2/α2
flexibility in their schedule. The ratio β/α represents the relationship between the absolute value of
time while traveling and the early arrival schedule delay penalty. We call travelers with lower value
of β/α as relatively time-flexible travelers. These travelers have more flexibility in their schedule
relative to the time they are willing to spend in the queue. Table 1 summarizes the definitions
and provides example usages. Without loss of generality, we label the groups so that group 1 is
relatively more (or as) time-flexible as group 2, that is,
β1/α1 ≤ β2/α2. (3.5)
The ratio β/α models relative willingness to pay and is integral to capturing the elements of time
poverty. For example, consider two travelers where the first traveler has α as 100 units and β as 10
units, while the second traveler has α as 30 units and β as 9 units (as in the example in Section 1).
The first traveler has higher α and thus has a greater absolute willingness to pay. The first traveler
also has higher β and thus is absolutely less time-flexible. However, the first traveler’s worth of
arriving at their destination is 10% of their absolute willingness to pay while the second’s is 30%.
This means that the second traveler who is relatively less time-flexible than the first traveler has
higher relative willingness to pay.
There are other alternatives for modeling heterogeneous vehicle groups for instance, considering
that α and β are uniform groups and γk/βk is what varies, or that vehicles differ not in their α, β, or
γ values, but in the desired arrival time at the destination, τ∗ (Arnott et al., 1987). In this article,
we focus our attention on the case where assumption A#8 holds true as under this case schedule
delays are not minimized at user-equilibrium and thus a system optimal toll that minimizes the
net costs of the system has a potential to favor absolutely time-flexible travelers over relatively
time-flexible travelers, which we show in Section 3.3 creates inequity.
3.2 No-toll equilibrium
The no-toll equilibrium was first derived by Arnott et al. (1987). The key result under the stated
assumptions can be summarized as follows: “at equilibrium, a fraction η/(1 + η) of each group
departs early, with the remainder departing late. For early departures, the traveler with lowest
value of β/α travel first, followed by other travelers in the increasing order of β/α values. For
late departures, travelers with highest value of β/α travel first, followed by other travelers in the
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increasing order of β/α values. If the inequalities [in Equation (3.5)] are strict, there is no overlap
between departure times of two groups.” Thus, under the presence of no-toll, travelers who are
relatively least time-flexible depart and arrive closest to the desired arrival time.
The above result can be used to determine the first and the last times of departure, denoted by
t0 and tf , respectively. We denote the transition time when the early travelers from group 1 cease
traveling and the early travelers from group 2 begin as tA. Similarly, tB is the time when the
late travelers from group 2 cease traveling and the late travelers from group 1 begin. We add
a superscript “NO” to indicate that these times are derived for no-toll case. The expression for
transition departure times can be derived a function of τ∗ as follows:
tNO0 = τ
∗ − η
1 + η
N
D
(3.6)
tNOf = τ
∗ +
1
1 + η
N
D
(3.7)
tNOA = τ
∗ − η
η + 1
N2
D
− β1
α1
η
1 + η
N1
D
(3.8)
tNOB = τ
∗ +
1
η + 1
N2
D
− β1
α1
η
1 + η
N1
D
(3.9)
These departure time values can be used to compute cost expressions which are shown in detail in
Appendix A. We provide numerical comparison of costs in Section 5.
3.3 System-optimal toll and equity concerns
A system-optimal (SO) toll minimizes the total cost across the system (excluding the toll costs
as these are assumed external to the benefits). This is achieved by charging a uniform toll for all
travelers who decide to depart at t, that is c1,SOtoll (t) = c
2,SO
toll (t).
Queuing costs are minimized when travelers arrive at the discharge rate and there is no queue.
That is, ck,SOqueue(t) = 0 for all k ∈ {1, 2} and n(t) = D. Because travelers face no queue, the arrival
and departure times are identical, that is τ(t) = t. The rush hour begins and ends at same time as
the no-toll equilibrium as the bottleneck is fully utilized and the values of total number of travelers
and discharge rate is identical (that is, tSO0 = t
NO
0 and τ(t
SO
f ) = τ(t
NO
f )). Schedule delay costs are
minimized when the group which is relatively less time-flexible travels closest to τ∗. Thus, we seek
tolls such that the travelers who are absolutely less time-flexible travel closer to τ∗.
At equilibrium all travelers segregate their departure times such that no traveler from a same group
travels together with a traveler from another group (unless the β values are identical for the groups).
Each travel group has an early departure and late departure. During early departure travelers from
group with lower β leave first, followed by travelers with higher β. During late departure, travelers
from group with higher β (and thus higher γ) travel first, followed by travelers of group with lower
β (or lower γ). Additionally, similar to the no-toll equilibrium case, the proportion of travelers
traveling early is η/(1 + η), which is same across all groups (Arnott et al., 1987).
The equilibrium property also implies that toll rates increase at the rate βk when group k is traveling
early and decrease at the rate γk when group k is traveling late. For deriving the values of transition
departure times, the SO toll has two scenarios.
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• Case 1: relatively more time-flexible travelers also are absolutely more time-flexible (β1/α1 <
β2/α2 and β1 < β2). Under this case, the order of travel is same as the no-toll equilibrium.
That is,
tSOA = τ(t
SO
A ) = τ
∗ − η
η + 1
N2
D
(3.10)
tSOB = τ(t
SO
B ) = τ
∗ +
1
η + 1
N2
D
(3.11)
• Case 2: relatively more time-flexible travelers are absolutely less time-flexible (β1/α1 < β2/α2
and β1 > β2). This case can only happen when α1 > α2, that is travelers from group 1 have
higher income than travelers from group 2. Under this case, the order of travel under SO
toll reverses (group 2 travels first, followed by group 1, then followed again by group 2). The
transition departure times formulae simply replace N2 with N1. That is,
tSOA = τ(t
SO
A ) = τ
∗ − η
η + 1
N1
D
(3.12)
tSOB = τ(t
SO
B ) = τ
∗ +
1
η + 1
N1
D
(3.13)
Note that in this case tSOA is the time when travelers who depart early (group 2) cease to
travel and the other group (group 1) starts their travel. The order of the groups is reversed,
but we use the same notation to warrant consistency.
The reversal of the order of travel under case 2 is one reason why the SO toll is inequitable. High-
income travelers with a higher value of β and γ travel at the center of the peak hour regardless of
the relative weight of their schedule delay penalty and groups with a lower value of time but higher
relative weight are shifted to the margins of the peak period. Thus, on top of having their actual
costs increased by the toll, low-income travelers are further harmed by being made more likely to
experience additional time poverty. Leisure time, as discussed in Section 2.3, is a primary social
good. The opportunity to eat breakfast with ones kids or head home to pick them up from soccer
practice is as valuable to low-income families as high income families in relative terms, even though
low-income families are not in a position to spend money in a way that reveals this preference on
the toll road.
In the following sections, we focus our attention on case 2. Under this case, the SO toll can
be expressed as Equation (3.14), where we use the expressions for tSOA and t
SO
B to cancel terms
β1(τ
∗ − tSOA ) and γ1(tSOB − τ∗). The new expressions for costs SDC, TRC, and TC under SO toll
for this case are detailed in Appendix A.
c1,SOtoll (t) = c
2,SO
toll (t) =

0 t ≤ tSO0
β2(t− tSO0 ) tSO0 < t ≤ tSOA
β2(t
SO
A − tSO0 ) + β1(t− tSOA ) tSOA < t ≤ τ∗
β2(t
SO
A − tSO0 ) + β1(τ∗ − tSOA )− γ1(t− τ∗) τ∗ < t ≤ tSOB
β2(t
SO
A − tSO0 )− γ2(t− tSOB ) tSOB < t ≤ tSOf
0 tf ≤ t
(3.14)
The second reason why the SO toll is inequitable is that it leads to welfare differences across different
travelers. Focusing on case 2 where the order of departure is reversed relative to the no-toll case,
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SO tolls benefit travelers with higher value of α. Assuming that the toll revenues are not rebated
directly to the travelers (A#9)3, Arnott et al. (1987) show that under this case the costs of group
1 is lower while the costs of group 2 is higher relative to the no-toll case. That is, group 1 travelers
benefit at the expense of group 2. We will quantify these differences in Section 5.
The SO tolls are horizontally equitable as everyone faces an identical option to pay the face value
of the toll and can choose to travel whenever they believe they will experience a minimal cost.
However, it can lead to reversal of order of travel and inequitable distribution of welfare benefiting
income-rich travelers from group 1 at the expense of group 2. In the next section, we propose a
vertically-equitable tolling scheme which addresses these concerns.
4 Time-equitable Toll
4.1 Definition
The time inequity of the SO tolling scheme is a feature, not a bug of that system. Low-income
travelers, who are already more likely to experience time poverty, are shunted to the margins of the
peak travel period in an effort to decrease the sum of the costs of travel for all citizens. Wealthier
travelers with a higher α experience a higher queuing cost for a given level of congestion (by
definition) and so the efforts to decrease total system costs have large marginal value from reducing
the costs for wealthier travelers. A time-equitable (TE) toll addresses the issues with the SO toll
by meeting three key desiderata.
1. Preserves order: The tolling scheme should preserve the same order of departures as in the
no-toll scenario. In the no-toll case, the departure order is a reflection of the relative weight
a group places on their schedule delay. An equitable program would show respect for all
travelers by preserving this ordering of preferences rather than attempting to coerce travelers
to choose departure times based on their absolute value of time.
2. Maintains zero queue: Similar to the SO toll, a TE toll must have zero queue at equi-
librium. This requirement is fundamental, reflecting that a traveler paying a toll should be
rewarded with no congestion. Thus, ckqueue(t) = 0, n(t) = D, and τ(t) = t for all k ∈ K and
t. Furthermore, since the bottleneck is always used at full capacity and the demand remains
fixed, the earliest and last arrival times under TE tolls match that of the no-toll case. That
is, tTE0 = t
NO
0 and τ(t
TE
f ) = τ(t
NO
f ).
3. Revenue-neutral: A time-equitable toll should generate the same revenues as the system
optimal toll. As discussed earlier in Section 2.3, cities and states use tolls both to ease conges-
tion and to shift the burden of paying for infrastructure onto those who use it. Alternatives
to the system optimal toll should raise at least as much money so that it does not shift the
cost of the infrastructure back onto non-travelers. The idea is to make travel at the middle
of the peak period affordable and fair, not to make it “free”.
We focus our attention on case 2 where absolutely more time-flexible travelers are relatively less
time-flexible. That is, β1 > β2 and β1/α1 < β2/α2. As before, γ/β = η is assumed constant across
3Litman (1997) argues that this is a reasonable assumption: because road networks are already subsidized by
taxes on non-drivers and through various externalities, the toll-payers are not even justified in demanding that the
rebate be given to them as a group. Instead it ought to be spent on social priorities that benefit all of the public,
such as water infrastructure, mass transit or even parks.
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all groups. If β1 < β2 and β1/α1 > β2/α2, then the SO toll satisfies all three requirements and is
thus time-equitable.
4.2 Deriving time equitable toll
Meeting the stated requirements of a time equitable toll is best achieved by charging different
rates to travelers from different groups. That is, we seek tolls that are vertically equitable with
respect to relative willingness to pay. Such a structure is acceptable because we want to favor the
disadvantaged groups and compensate for the inefficiencies of the SO toll. We defer the discussion
on real-world implementation of such vertically-equitable tolls to Section 6.1.
We propose a toll for each group that scales a function, which is uniform across groups, by the
value of time for that group. The SO tolls value the worth of a traveler based on their schedule
delay penalty parameters and thus lead to unjust switches between the order of departures. A toll
that scales with the α value of each group prevents the wealthier travelers who are absolutely less
time-flexible to receive benefits at the expense of poor travelers who are relatively less time-flexible.
Let ζ(t) be this function which is uniform across groups. The actual toll paid by a traveler is then
cktoll(t) = αkζ(t). We desire a value of ζ(t) such that the equilibrium condition in Definition 3 is
satisfied, which we derive using isocost-ζ curves.
For a moment, assume ζ(t) can be different across groups. If the total cost for all travelers in group
k is Ck, then an isocost-ζ curve for group k, denoted by ζk(ta | Ck), represents the variation in
ζ(ta) needed for the total cost to be Ck as a function of destination arrival time ta. Mathematically,
ζk(ta | Ck) =
(
Ck − ckSD(ta)
)
/αk, which is equivalent to Equation (4.1):
ζk(ta | Ck) =
{
(Ck − βk(τ∗ − ta)) /αk ta < τ∗
(Ck − γk(ta − τ∗)) /αk ta ≥ τ∗
. (4.1)
Figure 1 shows the plots of isocost-ζ curves for both groups for varying values of Ck. As observed,
the curve is an increasing function of arrival time with a slope βk/αk until ta = τ
∗ after which it
decreases with slope a γk/αk. Because group 2 is relatively less time-flexible, its isocost-ζ curves
have steeper slopes than group 1. For a larger Ck the arrival times are more spread out and
thus increasing the value of Ck shifts the corresponding isocost-ζ curve parallely outwards. Let
Ceqk be the total cost experienced by group k at the equilibrium. We highlight isocost-ζ curves
corresponding to the equilibrium cost in bold.
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Figure 1: Isocost-ζ curves for groups 1 and 2. The bold curves correspond to the equilibrium costs
Ceq1 and C
eq
2 for the two groups, respectively. Because of Lemma 1, the bold lines must intersect.
At equilibrium, the experienced value of ζ(t) is same across all groups for any arrival time, that is
ζk(ta | Ceqk ) = ζ(ta) for all k for every possible ta. Given this, we argue that equilibrium isocost-ζ
curves for both groups must intersect.
Lemma 1 At equilibrium, isocost-ζ curves for both groups must intersect.
Proof. Let us assume to the contrary that, at equilibrium, the curves do not intersect. For example,
let the equilibrium isocost-ζ curves correspond to the red dash-dot pattern lines in Figure 1 where
the isocost-ζ curve for group 2 is completely above the isocost-ζ curve for group 1. Because the
experienced ζ(t) value is identical for both groups for a given arrival time, the travelers from group
2 can reduce their ζ values (and thus the total cost values) by switching to the arrival/departure
time of travelers from group 1. This implies that the current isocost-ζ curve for group 2 is not at
equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
We define tTEA as the arrival time at the first intersection point and t
TE
B as the arrival time at the
second intersection point, as shown in Figure 1.
All users in group k must arrive in arrival times corresponding to the Ceqk curve. However, the
arrival time of group k cannot be any time ta when the isocost-ζ curve at equilibrium for group k
is below that for the other group k¯, because otherwise the travelers from the group k¯ can switch
to arrival time ta and reduce their costs. Thus the arrival times for each group is such that the
equilibrium value of ζ(t) is an upper envelope of the equilibrium isocost-ζ curves of both groups.
That is, in Figure 1, group 1 arrives in time (tTE0 , t
TE
A ) ∪ (tTEB , tTEf ), while group 2 arrives in time
(tTEA , t
TE
B ). Given our assumption on group values, we thus have that the order of departure at
equilibrium is the same as the no-toll scenario. Hence, tolls derived from the equilibrium value of
ζ(t) preserve the order of travel.
Similar to the arguments for no-toll, we can show that the number of travelers departing early for
each group is a fixed proportion of the number of travelers in each group.
Theorem 1 At equilibrium, the proportion of each group that departs early is η/(1 + η).
Proof. See Appendix B.
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The values of tTEA and t
TE
B are also derived in Appendix B and they have the same value as the
arrival times for the no-toll case. The value of ζ(t) at the equilibrium is given by:
ζ(t) =

0 t < tTE0
β1
α1
(t− tTE0 ) tTE0 ≤ t < tTEA
β1
α1
(tTEA − tTE0 ) + β2α2 (t− tTEA ) tTEA ≤ t < τ∗
β1
α1
(tTEA − tTE0 ) + β2α2 (τ∗ − tTEA )−
γ2
α2
(t− τ∗) τ∗ ≤ t < tTEB
β1
α1
(tTEA − tTE0 ) + β2α2 (τ∗ − tTEA )−
γ2
α2
(tTEB − τ∗)− γ1α1 (t− tTEB ) tTEB ≤ t < tTEf
0 tTEf ≤ t
(4.2)
We refer the tolls derived from this ζ(t) as TE1 tolls. The toll charged for group k is given by
ck,TE1toll (t) = αkζ(t). We define ℘, called the toll-rate escalator, as the ratio of α/β for group 1 to
that of group 2, that is, ℘ = β2/α2β1/α1 . Given the assumption about the values of αk and βk, ℘ is
always greater than 1. We can express TE1 tolls in terms of ℘ as in Equations (4.3) and (4.4).
We use Theorem 1 for the time periods tTEB < t ≤ tTEf that allows βk(τ∗ − tTEA ) = γk(tTEB − τ∗) for
k ∈ {1, 2}.4
c1,TE1toll (t) =

β1(t− tTE0 ) tTE0 ≤ t ≤ tTEA
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + ℘ · β1(t− tTEA ) tTEA < t ≤ τ∗
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + ℘ ·
(
β1(τ
∗ − tTEA )− γ1(t− τ∗)
)
τ∗ < t ≤ tTEB
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 )− γ1(t− tTEB ) tTEB < t ≤ tTEf
(4.3)
c2,TE1toll (t) =

1
℘β2(t− tTE0 ) tTE0 ≤ t ≤ tTEA
1
℘β2(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + β2(t− tTEA ) tTEA < t ≤ τ∗
1
℘β2(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + β2(τ∗ − tTEA )− γ2(t− τ∗) τ∗ < t ≤ tTEB
1
℘
(
β2(t
TE
A − tTE0 )− γ2(t− tTEB )
)
tTEB < t ≤ tTEf
(4.4)
We note that the toll costs perfectly substitute for the queuing costs in the no-toll equilibrium case
(as a function of the arrival time). Thus the total costs under the presence of TE1 tolls is same as
the total costs under no-toll equilibrium and the revenue obtained from TE1 tolls is equal to the
queuing costs under no-toll equilibrium. However, queuing costs under no-toll case are not equal
to the revenue from SO tolls.5 Thus, TE1 tolls are not revenue-neutral. We next modify TE1 tolls
such that the new set of tolls generate same revenue as the SO tolls.
We start with the following property of the tolls at equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If the demand is inelastic, the departure times for each group at equilibrium is preserved
under following modifications to the TE1 toll: (a) adding a constant to the TE1 toll for all departure
times, or (b) increasing the toll by any positive amount for a group k for the duration when the
group is not traveling.
4LHS = βk(τ
∗ − tTEA ) = βk
(
η
1+η
N2
D
)
= βkη
(
1
1+η
N2
D
)
= γk
(
1
1+η
N2
D
)
= γk(t
TE
B − τ∗) = RHS
5In fact, the analysis of cost expressions in Appendix A shows that queuing costs under no-toll are lower than SO
toll revenue.
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Proof. Since the demand is inelastic, travelers have no other choice but to travel regardless of the
toll value. We look at individual cases. First, if the tolls are increased uniformly across all time
periods (including time periods outside the range (t0, tf )), then the order of departure and the
departure times are not impacted as travelers have no incentive to choose other departure times.
Second, if the tolls are only increased in the time period when a traveler is not traveling and only
for that group, then travelers are still comfortable with their current arrival times and have no
incentive to switch to other arrival times, thus preserving the equilibrium departure times.
Lemma 2 provides ideas to modify TE1 tolls so that we achieve the revenue of SO tolls. Let us
parameterize the TE1 tolls in Equations (4.3)–(4.4) considering toll-rate escalator ℘ as a general
parameter, resulting in a general toll ck,Gentoll (t, ℘) for each group k.
We propose a set of tolls, called TE2 tolls, as follows: c1,TE2toll (t) = c
1,Gen
toll (t, ℘¯) for ℘¯ ≥ 1, and
c2,TE2toll (t) = c
2,Gen
toll (t, 1). Equations (4.5)–(4.6) provide the expression. Next, we show that TE2 tolls
satisfy desired properties of time-equitable tolls.
c1,TE2toll (t) =

β1(t− tTE0 ) tTE0 ≤ t ≤ tTEA
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + ℘¯ · β1(t− tTEA ) tTEA < t ≤ τ∗
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) + ℘¯ ·
(
β1(τ
∗ − tTEA )− γ1(t− τ∗)
)
τ∗ < t ≤ tTEB
β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 )− γ1(t− tTEB ) tTEB < t ≤ tTEf
(4.5)
c2,TE2toll (t) =
{
β2(t− tTE0 ) tTE0 ≤ t ≤ τ∗
β2(τ
∗ − tTE0 )− γ2(t− τ∗) τ∗ ≤ t ≤ tTEf
(4.6)
Theorem 2 TE2 tolls preserve order of departure, maintain zero queue, and are revenue-neutral
Proof. For group 1, TE2 tolls are identical to TE1 tolls when a group departs early or late and only
charges different values of tolls when a group does not travel. For group 2, TE2 tolls raise TE1
tolls uniformly by the amount
(
1− 1℘
)
β2(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) during the period group 2 travels, and for
all other times increases the toll arbitrarily. Thus, by Lemma 2 the order of travel at equilibrium
under TE2 tolls is same as TE1 tolls. Furthermore, because TE2 tolls are derived from TE1 tolls,
they continue to maintain zero queue.
What remains to show is that TE2 tolls generate same revenue as SO tolls, which we show using
geometric arguments. The graphs of TE2 and SO tolls are shown in Figure 2 where the toll curve
for each group is highlighted in solid lines of different thickness. Additionally, using the expressions
of tSOA , t
TE
A , t
SO
B and t
TE
B , the length of time scale can be expressed in terms of Nk and D as shown.
Total revenue is the area under the bold curve multiplied by the discharge rate D.
We argue that the areas under the curve are equal. First, triangle OAB in SO toll has the same
area as triangle B′E′D′ in TE2 toll as both triangles are right angled and have the same base
length and the slope of the hypotenuse. Similarly, the area of triangle ACD is equal to the area
of triangle O′A′C ′, the area of triangle CDF is equal to the area of triangle F ′I ′H ′, and the area
of triangle FGH is equal to the area of triangle D′E′G′. The only remaining area is the area of
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Figure 2: Toll curves for SO toll and TE2 toll for the two groups as a function of arrival times.
The area under the curves is equal implying that both tolls generate same revenue
rectangles ABGF and B′C ′H ′G′ which are also equal as evaluated below:
area(ABGF ) = length(AB) ∗ length(BG)
=
(
β2η
1 + η
N2
D
)
∗
(
N1
D
)
=
β2ηN1N2
(1 + η)D2
area(B′C ′H ′G′) = length(B′C ′) ∗ length(C ′H ′)
=
(
β2η
1 + η
N1
D
)
∗
(
N2
D
)
=
β2ηN1N2
(1 + η)D2
Hence proved.
We have established that TE2 tolls are time-equitable and generate the same schedule delay cost as
the no-toll case and same revenue as the SO toll case. We include the complete cost expressions for
the TE2 toll in the Appendix A. There are other variants of time-equitable toll that can generate
the same revenue as SO tolls; TE2 tolls are one example of this.
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4.3 Welfare analysis of TE1 and TE2 tolls
In this section we compare the total cost for each group under TE1 and TE2 tolls relative to the
case of no-toll. Under assumption A#9, we consider that toll revenues are not rebated directly to
the travelers (and are instead invested towards local community projects).
For TE1 tolls, total costs for all travelers remain the same as the no-toll case. This is as expected,
since the toll costs exactly substitute the travel time savings. However, for TE2 tolls, we show
that the costs of group 2 are higher relative to the no-toll case, while the costs of group 1 are
unimpacted.
Proposition 1 Under the case of no-rebate, costs of group 2 are higher under TE2 toll relative to
the no-toll case, while the costs of group 1 remain the same.
Proof. Since the same proportion of group 1 travelers travel at the edge of the peak period in both
the TE2 and the no-toll case, and since the start and end of peak period is the same, the cost of
any traveler in group 1 is identical across both cases and equals β1η1+η
N1
s . Thus, group 1 faces no
extra cost relative to the no-toll case.
Cost of each traveler in group 2 under TE2 toll is same across all departure times in (tTEA , t
TE
B ).
Evaluating the cost of a traveler arriving at time τ∗ (who only incurs the toll cost) we have,
TCTE22 = β2(τ
∗ − tTE0 ) (4.7)
= β2
(
η
1 + η
N
s
)
. (4.8)
Cost of each traveler in group 2 under no toll is obtained from Arnott et al. (1987) as follows:
TCNO2 = β1
[
α2
α1
−
(
α2
α1
− β2
β1
)
f2
](
η
1 + η
N
s
)
, (4.9)
where f2 is the proportion of group 2 travelers (that is, f2 = N2/N). We compare β2 with
β1
[
α2
α1
−
(
α2
α1
− β2β1
)
f2
]
and show that the latter expression is always smaller. This can be observed
by the following set of inequalities:
f2 < 1 (∵ N2 < N)
⇒
(
α1
β1
− α2
β2
)
f2 ≤
(
α1
β1
− α2
β2
)
(∵ α1/β1 > α2/β2)
⇒
(
α1
β1
− α2
β2
)
f2 +
α2
β2
≤ α1
β1
⇒ β1
(
β2
β1
− α2
α1
)
f2 +
α2β1
α1
≤ β2 (multiply by β2β1/α1)
⇒ β1
[
α2
α1
−
(
α2
α1
− β2
β1
)
f2
]
≤ β2
⇒ TCNO2 ≤ TCTE22
Hence proved.
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Proposition 1 shows that, similar to SO toll, costs of group 2 are higher under TE2 toll relative
to the no-toll equilibrium. This raises potential “equity concerns.” After all, if the point of the
time-equitable toll is to be equitable, then a toll that eliminates congestion by charging relatively
less time-flexible travelers (who have lower income) more than they believe their time waiting in
traffic is worth while exactly substituting the cost of queuing for high income travelers with a toll
is certainly suspicious. However, there are two ways in which the proposed tolling scheme is more
equitable as becomes apparent when we compare the outcomes of the SO toll and the TE2 toll.
First, an increase in the cost of group 2 under TE2 tolls are not obtained by making group 1 better
off. In both the SO and TE2 tolls group 2 experiences an increase in costs, but in the SO toll all of
this welfare is transferred to group 1. Under TE2 tolls, although group 2 experiences higher costs,
they are not compelled to transfer their costs into a benefit for other travelers. Should group 2
travelers decide that they do not have the funds to pay a toll in the center of the peak hour, they
always have the option to forego the time benefits by choosing to travel outside of their group’s
time slot since their costs are flat over the entire peak hour.
Second, because TE2 toll preserves the order, it prioritizes travelers who are relatively less time-
flexible. TE2 tolls may not minimize the total costs for the system, yet, they preserve the order
and generate vertical equity for time as a resource.
5 Numerical Comparisons
In this section, we present numerical comparisons of costs under no toll, and the SO, TE1, and
TE2 tolls. The analytic expressions of costs are provided in Appendix A.
5.1 Base case scenario
First, we consider a base case scenario with the following parameter values. Consider two groups
with 30 travelers each (N1 = N2 = 30 and N = 60). Let the values of α1 and α2 be 24ℵ and 12ℵ
per time unit, respectively.6 We set the value of β1/α1 = 1/3 and β2/α2 = 1/2 to consider the
case where low-income travelers in group 2 are relatively less time-flexible (since this is the case
that highlights the time-poverty). We assume a constant value of the ratio of late and early arrival
penalties as 4 for both groups (that is, γ1/β1 = γ2/β2 = η = 4). The bottleneck capacity is set as
6 vehicles per time unit. Without loss of generality, we consider desired arrival time τ∗ = 0 for all
vehicles.
First we compare the variation of different costs for each toll case with the arrival time at the
destination as shown in Figure 3.
For the cases of SO, TE1, and TE2 tolls, the arrival time is same as the departure time. The plots
in Figure 3 show the cost a traveler from group 1 or 2 would experience if they arrive the destination
at a given time. The experienced cost (shown as an overlayed solid line) is the true experienced
cost based on when the group travels. For the cases of no toll, TE1 toll, and TE2 toll, group 1
travels at the boundary of the peak period while group 2 travels in the middle. For the SO toll,
the order is reversed. TE1 and TE2 tolls charge different toll for different groups. In contrast, the
SO toll does not depend on which group is traveling during the time; hence, the tolls in Figure 3e
6The ℵ symbol is used to further underscore the break from empirical research and to guard against the temptation
to see these values in terms of US dollars or other familiar currency.
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Figure 3: Plots of time-varying costs for the cases of no toll ((a),(b), and (c)), SO toll ((d),(e), and
(f)), TE1 toll ((g),(h), and (i)), and TE2 toll ((j),(k), and (l)). For cases of no toll, TE1 toll, and
TE2 toll group 1 travels at the boundaries of the peak period, while for the case of SO toll, the
order is reversed.
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do not differ for each group. The toll plot for group 1 under TE2 toll in Figure 3k considers the
value of ℘¯ = 1.25; however, the plot of experienced cost is same for any choice of ℘¯ greater than 1.
Plots of cktoll(t) for the no toll case and c
k
queue(t) for the SO, TE1, and TE2 toll cases are not shown
as their values are zero for both groups for the entire peak period.
The observations from Figure 3 illustrate our findings from previous sections. The ckSD(t) costs for
the TE1 and TE2 tolls are identical to the no-toll case since they preserve the order of departure.
The TE1 toll exactly substitutes travel time cost for each group with the toll cost paid by the group
(experienced cost plots in Figures 3b and 3h are identical). In contrast, the TE2 toll increases the
toll paid by group 2 to generate same revenue as the SO toll. This is apparent in the equal areas
under the solid-line toll curves for Figures 3e and 3k. Last, as expected, the total cost for each
group is lowest during the time the group is traveling, since at equilibrium total costs are minimized
for the chosen departure times.
Next, we quantify the benefit to the individuals and the community under different toll scenarios.
Consider the schematic in Figure 4 that shows the benefit and cost to the individuals and the
community. We consider that tolls collected from individuals are not directly rebated but are
invested back into the community.
Figure 4: Schematic showing the benefit and cost to individuals and community. Individuals’ net
benefit is the incurred savings relative to the paid toll. Community’s net benefit is the total incurred
savings and total revenue collected.
Benefit to the community: Let us assume that the cost of installing the toll gantries (via open-
road tolling methods) is same regardless of the type of tolling in place. Under this case, we can
calculate the social benefit to the community under a given toll scenario x, x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}, as
the sum of travel time savings for each individual relative to the no-toll case and the total revenue
collected. That is,
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Social benefitx = Savings relative to the no-toll case + Revenue collected
=
∑
k∈K
Savingsxk + TRC
x
k ∀x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}
=
∑
k∈K
(
SDCNOk + TTC
NO
k − SDCxk
)
+ TRCxk ∀x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}
=
(
SDCNO + TTCNO − SDCx)+ TRCx ∀x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}
where, Savingskx =
(
SDCNOk + TTC
NO
k − SDCxk
)
is the total savings for group k under toll scenario
x, x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}, defined as the difference between the combined schedule delay and travel
time costs for no toll case and the toll case x.
Benefit to an individual: An individual pays toll in exchange for travel time delay and/or
schedule delay savings relative to the no-toll case. Therefore, we define the net benefit received by
an individual as follows: let yxk be the ratio of social cost savings for a group k relative to the no-toll
case and the total toll paid by the group for a given toll scenario x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}. That is,
yxk =
Savingsxk
TRCxk
(5.1)
=
SDCNOk + TTC
NO
k − SDCxk
TRCxk
∀x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}, k ∈ K. (5.2)
Intuitively, yxk measures the benefit received by a group k under the presence of toll regime x relative
to the toll paid by the group. A value of yxk = 1 indicates that the group receives benefit in equal
worth to the toll paid, which is an ideal scenario. A high difference between the values of yxk for
different groups is inequitable since a difference indicates that one group is worse off than the other.
We define the difference between the maximum and minimum values of yxk across different groups
as the equity gap for a given toll scenario. Next, we compare the social benefit and the equity gap
for the three tolls.
Figure 5 shows the variation of social benefit for all toll scenarios relative to the no-toll case, with
the savings and toll paid split by each group. As expected, SO tolls generate the largest social
benefit across all groups. This is attributed to the cost minimizing nature of SO tolls. While the
savings across groups 1 and 2 are identical for TE1 and TE2 tolls, TE2 tolls generate 240ℵ higher
social benefit that TE1 tolls. This is attributed to the revenue-neutral nature of TE2 tolls. While
SO tolls generate the highest possible social benefit, the split of benefit across different groups is
uneven leading to equity issues which we highlight next.
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Figure 5: Social benefit across different toll scenarios for the base case scenario
Figure 6 shows the variation of yxk for each group for the three toll scenarios. We observe that
TE1 toll generates equitable benefit for both groups with yTE11 = y
TE2
2 = 1. This is as expected:
TE1 tolls preserve the order so the benefit received by a group is same as the group’s travel-time
cost under the no-toll scenario, which is identical to the toll paid by the group under the TE1
toll. As discussed in Section 3.3, SO toll generates the highest differences between the two groups
where group 1 with ySO1 = 1.2 benefits more at the expense of group 2 with y
SO
2 = 0.33. TE2 tolls
also generate differences between the group (because we make group 2 pay more than their savings
to generate the same revenue as the SO toll), but the equity gap of 0.23 (where, yTE21 = 1 and
yTE22 = 0.77) is not as high as the SO toll.
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Figure 6: Cost savings for each group relative to the toll paid. SO toll has the highest equity gap
Thus, we observe a tradeoff between the social benefit to the community and the equity gap
between different groups. On one end, TE1 tolls generate a zero equity gap, but have the lowest
social benefit, while on the other hand, SO tolls have the highest social benefit, but generate a high
equity gap between the two groups. TE2 tolls provide a middle ground between the two extremes.
Next, we conduct sensitivity analysis of social benefit and equity gap between the groups under
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different toll scenarios for varying values of parameter values.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we assume that the parameters of group 2 (β2 and α2) and the number of travelers
(N) are held constant as the base case. Variation in all other variables is considered. We only
consider the case where β1 > β2 so that the SO toll’s equity issues are highlighted. Thus, β1/β2 is
considered a variable with values higher than 1. Similarly, given the criteria for original group num-
bering in Section 3, we consider α1/β1 > α2/β2. We conduct sensitivity of social benefit and equity
gap against five variables: bottleneck capacity (D), ratio of late arrival penalty to early arrival
penalty (η), proportion of group 2 travelers (f2), the ratio β1/β2, and the ratio (α1/β1)/(α2/β2).
We vary one variable at a time keeping the other variables constant to their base values given by
D = 6 veh/min, η = 4, f2 = 0.5, β1/β2 = 3/2, and (α1/β1)/(α2/β2) = 4/3.
Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the variation in equity gap and social benefit for varying values of
D, η, f2, β1/β2, and (α1/β1)/(α2/β2), respectively. The equity gap is shown as a region where the
upper boundary marks the value of yx1 for group 1, while the lower boundary of the region is the
value of yx2 for group 2 for different toll scenarios x ∈ {SO,TE1,TE2}. Although the equity gap
region for the TE1 toll is a fixed line with a value of 1.0, we still include this toll for completeness.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of equity gap and social benefit relative to bottleneck capacity (D)
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of equity gap and social benefit relative to η
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Figure 9: Sensitivity of equity gap and social benefit relative to proportion of group 2 travelers f2
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of equity gap and social benefit relative to the ratio of β1/β2
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Figure 11: Sensitivity of equity gap and social benefit relative to the ratio of (α1/β1)/(α2/β2)
We make the following observations:
1. Similar to the base case scenario, the social benefit and the equity gap for the SO tolls are
always higher than the TE1 and TE2 tolls.
2. Figure 7b shows that as the bottleneck capacity increases, social benefit decreases. This is
because the congestion under the no-toll case is lower when more capacity is available to meet
the same demand, resulting in lower savings after charging a toll. Similarly, in Figure 8b,
social benefit increases with an increase in the value of η, since cost savings are a function
of the term η/(1 + η) which increases as η increases. Furthermore, the equity gap for the
SO, TE1 and TE2 tolls remain constant for all values of D and η (keeping other variables
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constant). This can be seen after substituting the cost expressions in Equation (5.1) where
the η and D terms in the numerator and the denominator cancel out.
3. Figure 9b shows the variation in social benefit for different values of f2. At the extreme values
(f2 = 0 and f2 = 1), the population comprises of only one group. This results in identical
social cost savings under different toll scenarios, which is because for each toll scenario, the
toll increases (or decreases) at the rate of β (or γ) in the time period when the group travels.
For the intermediate values of f2, the social benefit achieves a minima for the TE1 and TE2
tolls where the point of minima depends on the ratios of (α1/β1)/(α2/β2) and β1/β2 for each
group. Since we are interested in maximizing the social benefit, the largest benefit is obtained
only if all travelers in the population are uniform and have high α and β values.
4. Figure 9a shows that as the value of f2 decreases the equity gap between the two groups
increases for both TE2 and SO tolls. The value of the ratio evaluated from Equation (5.1)
may be negative if the value of Savingsxk for a group is negative (that is, the group has higher
schedule delay under the presence of a toll than the combined travel time delay and schedule
delay under the no-toll case.) The equity gap is undefined when f2 = 0 or when f2 = 1
as there is only one group under those settings. For the case when f2 is very close to zero,
ySO2 → −∞ and the equity gap for the SO toll case tends to ∞. This is as expected: under
SO tolls, group 2 is pushed to travel at the boundary of the peak period; if there are relatively
few travelers from group 2, they face much higher schedule delay, while continuing to pay
tolls, and the rate of increase of tolls is higher than the rate of decrease of savings. This
finding shows us that if the population for travelers who are absolutely more time-flexible
travelers but are relatively less time-flexible is really small, they suffer significantly in order
to provide positive savings for the other travel group. A large equity gap is attributed to the
reversal of the order of travel which contributes to the time-inequity of SO tolls. The equity
gap generated by the TE2 tolls is also higher for lower values of f2, but not as high as the
SO tolls.
5. Increasing the ratio of β1/β2 increases the equity gap for the SO toll scenario, but the equity
gap under TE2 and TE1 tolls remain the same. Additionally, the social benefit increases with
increasing value of β1/β2 for all tolls, but the rate of increase is higher for the SO tolls. This
pattern exists because the savings of each group under TE1 and TE2 tolls depend on their
relative willingness to pay, not their absolute values. On the other hand, the SO toll depends
on the absolute values of β1 and β2 and thus increasing the ratio increases the social benefit
(at a higher rate than TE1 and TE2 tolls) as well as the equity gap.
6. Last, we observe that increasing the value of the (α1/β1)/(α2/β2) increases the equity gap
but decreases the social benefit. This is as expected: as the relative time-flexibility of group
2 decreases relative to group 1, group 2 travelers are more worse off for both SO and TE2
tolls.
The sensitivity analysis helps us identify that the equity gap for the SO toll is highly sensitive
to the relative population of two groups and the values of parameters determining absolute and
relative time-flexibility.
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6 Conclusion
In this article we discussed equity issues for dynamic tolls. Building on the idea that “all social goods
are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would be to everyone’s advantage,”
we made a case for the inclusion of time poverty through the use of vertically-equitable tolls for
dynamic pricing. We showed that the commonly-used SO tolls present two distinct equity concerns.
First, they achieve their efficient outcome by shifting a greater percentage of system costs to low
income travelers. Second, SO tolls are likely to increase time poverty among low income travelers
since these tolls order traveler departures on the absolute value of traveler time rather than the
relative value of schedule delay to travel time delay costs that orders no-toll equilibria. The result
is that structuring traveler departures so that low income travelers depart at the margins of the
peak hour means that already overburdened families face significant burdens of time poverty.
As an alternative to the inefficiencies of the SO toll, we proposed time-equitable tolls that preserve
the order of departure under no toll, create zero queue, and generate same revenue as the SO tolls.
Using numerical experiments for two groups of travelers, we showed that while SO tolls generate the
highest possible social benefit across all tolling scenarios, they lead to a wide equity gap between
different groups of travelers. In contrast, time-equitable tolls sacrifice some of the social benefit in
exchange for lowering the equity gap in the population. These insights into the trade offs between
system-optimal efficiency and equity will help prioritize tolling objectives for future dynamic tolling
schemes and inform empirical research into how those objectives may be fulfilled.
6.1 Implementation concerns about time-equitable toll
Implementing vertically-equitable tolls that vary across different groups in the real world brings
challenges that are worth discussing. There are four main concerns about implementing these tolls:
(a) The proposed tolls are time-dependent and vary continuously with time. While a continuous
toll variation is possible (we can record the exact time when the vehicle entered the bottleneck
and charge an appropriate toll), it is desirable that tolls are incremented in discrete time
intervals for the ease of public understanding. A few alternatives have been presented to fix
this problem. These include replacing dynamic tolls with a flat peak-period toll (also called
coarse tolls, see Arnott et al., 1990; Xiao et al., 2011), or charging step tolls that increment
toll values in discrete steps of time (Lindsey et al., 2010). Both coarse tolls and step tolls are
easy to implement as they do not vary continuously with time; however, it is unclear whether
they can be customized for achieving time equity. A detailed mathematical analysis of how
these tolls will impact the equilibrium departure patterns and the equity gap is left as part
of the future work.
(b) The tolls are not bounded above. In our analysis, the highest toll values depend on the
values of parameters such as α, β, and γ values of a group and the number of travelers
and the capacity of the bottleneck. Because the highest toll is inversely proportion to the
bottleneck capacity, an agency can lower the highest toll charge by providing more capacity.
Alternatively, our analysis assumes inelastic demand regardless of how high the toll is. If
tolls are high, that will deter the travelers from choosing the tolled facility, thereby lowering
the demand and thus the toll. We leave a detailed analysis of the highest possible toll under
elastic demand for future work.
(c) The values of α, β, and γ must be known. The analysis relies on good-enough estimates
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of these parameters for determining the tolls and for analyzing the social benefit and equity
gaps. In our opinion, our choice of discrete number of groups allows more flexibility. Using
a survey conducted on a sample of travelers who use a freeway during peak periods, we can
estimate the values of α, β, and γ and combine them into as many number of groups as the
analysis desires. The consequence of loosely estimated values of α, β or γ is that the true
experience of benefits and equity gap might be skewed. In such cases, we recommend the use
of post-toll-implementation surveys that can help us measure the true benefits received by a
traveler of each group.
(d) The time-equitable toll requires different tolls for distinct groups. There are a few ways to
address this concern. One alternative is to code driver characteristics as part of the vehicle
(like a toll tag that is encoded with demographic and time-preference parameters). This allows
a vehicle to be categorized into one group or the other, which can then be used to charge
different tolls. However, such use of vehicle tags can incentivize fraudulent activities such
as relatively time-rich travelers selling their tags to relatively time-poor travelers. The other
alternative is to propose a rebate scheme where everyone pays a uniform toll, but travelers
are then rebated similar to income-tax return based on their usage of the facility. This is
similar to the idea of tradable bottleneck permit in Akamatsu and Wada (2017); however we
leave a detailed analysis as part of the future work.
We hope that future researchers will investigate ways in which these implementation challenges can
be addressed.
6.2 Future work
There are several other directions for future work. First, an analysis using more realistic congestion
is warranted. Introducing networks with alternate paths, networks with multiple destinations,
bottlenecks with stochastic capacity, travelers who desire to arrive throughout the peak hour, and
travelers who can choose not travel to the bottleneck will provide further insights on tolls and
equity. Second, future research should investigate ways for empirical estimations of time poverty
parameters and place them in a context that policy makers will understand and appreciate. Last,
the future research should address real world implementations of dynamic tolls with the equity
analysis proposed in this thesis. The real world is messy. Real cities have hundreds of thousands
of travelers who all have hundreds of variables, most of which are unobservable, affecting their
decision to travel and this greatly complicates the problem of determining how tolls should be
priced in order to equitably minimize congestion. An important piece of this puzzle, however, is to
dive into the details of actual traveler decisions. This remains an important next step for future
research.
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A Cost expressions for the three tolling scenarios
We write the total cost expressions for different toll scenarios here, assuming two travel groups. In
addition to the notation defined earlier, define f2 = N2/N as the proportion of travelers belonging
to group 2.
A.1 No-toll equilibrium
Schedule delay costs:
SDC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f22 ) (A.1)
SDC2 =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N22
D
=
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
β2
β1
f22 (A.2)
SDC =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
β2
β1
− 1
)
f22
]
(A.3)
Travel time costs
TTC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)2 (A.4)
TTC2 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
f2
[
2
α2
α1
+
(
β2
β1
− 2α2
α1
)
f2
]
(A.5)
TTC =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1− 2
(
1− α2
α1
)
f2 +
(
1 +
β2
β1
− 2α2
α1
)
f22
]
(A.6)
Toll costs Under no-toll, toll revenue is zero. That is, TRC1 = TRC2 = TRC = 0.
Total costs
TC1 =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2) (A.7)
TC2 =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
f2
[
α2
α1
+
(
β2
β1
− α2
α1
)
f2
]
(A.8)
TC =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
α2
α1
− 1
)
f2 +
(
β2
β1
− α2
α1
)
f22
]
(A.9)
A.2 Tolled equilibrium: order preserved β2 > β1
In this case, the order of travel is preserved and the SO, TE1, and TE2 tolls are identical.
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Schedule delay costs The schedule delay costs are same as the no-toll case (Equation (A.1)–(A.3))
because the order is preserved and the same proportion of each group travels early.
Travel time costs Since there is no queue, travel time costs are zero under the modeling choice
that sets free-flow travel time (ckFF)(t) is set as zero for all groups k ∈ {1, 2}. That is, TTC1 =
TTC2 = TTC = 0
Toll costs
TRC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)2 (A.10)
TRC2 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
f2
[
2(1− f2) + β2
β1
f2
]
(A.11)
TRC =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 + f22
(
β2
β1
− 1
)]
(A.12)
Total costs
TC1 =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2) (A.13)
TC2 =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
f2
[
1 +
(
β2
β1
− 1
)
f2
]
(A.14)
TC =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
β2
β1
− 1
)
f22
]
(A.15)
As observed, total cost for group 1 stays the same as the no-toll case. The total cost for group 2 is
higher under no-toll case only if α2 > α1.
A.3 Tolled Equilibrium: β1 > β2
A.3.1 SO toll
For the SO toll, the order is reversed.
Schedule delay costs
SDC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N21
D
=
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
β1
β2
(1− f2)2 (A.16)
SDC2 =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− (1− f2)2) (A.17)
SDC =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
β1
β2
− 1
)
(1− f2)2
]
(A.18)
Travel time costs are zero due to zero queue.
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Toll costs
TRC1 =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)
[
2f2 +
β1
β2
(1− f2)
]
(A.19)
TRC2 =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
f22 (A.20)
TRC =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
β1
β2
− 1
)
(1− f2)2
]
(A.21)
Total costs
TC1 =
β2η
(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)
[
1 +
(
β1
β2
− 1
)
(1− f2)
]
(A.22)
TC2 =
β2η
(1 + η)
N2
D
f2 (A.23)
TC =
β2η
(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
β1
β2
− 1
)
(1− f2)2
]
(A.24)
As we can compare the total costs, we can see that group 1 is better off under SO toll relative to
no toll, while group 2 is worse off.
A.3.2 TE1 toll
Schedule delay costs are same as the no-tolled scenario as the order is preserved (Equations (A.1)–
(A.3)).
Travel time costs are zero due to zero queue.
Toll costs have the same value as TTC of no-toll scenario.
TRC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)2 (A.25)
TRC2 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
f2
[
2
α2
α1
+
(
β2
β1
− 2α2
α1
)
f2
]
(A.26)
TTC =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1− 2
(
1− α2
α1
)
f2 +
(
1 +
β2
β1
− 2α2
α1
)
f22
]
(A.27)
Total costs are also identical to the no-toll scenario (Equations (A.7)–(A.9)).
A.3.3 TE2 toll
Schedule delay costs are same as the no-tolled scenario as the order is preserved (Equations (A.1)–
(A.3)).
Travel time costs are zero due to zero queue.
Toll costs are in total same as the SO toll since TE2 toll is revenue-neutral but the individual
group tolls differ.
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TRC1 =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2)2 (A.28)
TRC2 =
β2η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
(2f2 − f22 ) =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
β2
β1
(2f2 − f22 ) (A.29)
TRC =
β1η
2(1 + η)
N2
D
[
1 +
(
f22 − 2f2
)(
1− β2
β1
)]
(A.30)
Total costs compute to the following upon adding the schedule delay costs and toll costs.
TC1 =
β1η
(1 + η)
N2
D
(1− f2) (A.31)
TC2 =
β2η
(1 + η)
N2
D
f2 (A.32)
TC =
β1η
1 + η
N2
D
[
1−
(
1− β2
β1
)
f2
]
(A.33)
Total costs are overall higher for group 2, but remain unchanged for group 1.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Here we provide the proof that the proportion of travelers departing early is same for both groups.
The proof follows the same structure as Appendix B of Arnott et al. (1987).
Lemma 3 The ζ values at the points of intersection of the equilibrium isocost−ζ curves are iden-
tical. That is, ζ(tTEA ) = ζ(t
TE
B )
Proof. For the equilibrium isocost−ζ curves, the costs incurred are identical for all travelers within
each group. That is, Ceq1 (t
TE
A ) = C
eq
1 (t
TE
B ) and C
eq
2 (t
TE
A ) = C
eq
2 (t
TE
B ). Writing out the expressions:
Ceq1 (t
TE
A ) = C
eq
1 (t
TE
B ) (B.1)
=⇒ α1ζ(tTEA ) + β1(τ∗ − tTEA ) = α1ζ(tTEB ) + γ1(tTEB − τ∗) (B.2)
Dividing Equation B.2 by β1 and substracting the result from the corresponding equation for group
2, we obtain:
(
α1
β1
− α2
β2
)
(ζ(tTEA )− ζ(tTEB )) = 0 (B.3)
Given α2/β2 < α1/β1, we have ζ(t
TE
A ) = ζ(t
TE
B ). Hence proved.
Using this Lemma, we can prove Theorem 1.
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Proof. We know that group 1 arrives in time (tTE0 , t
TE
A ) ∪ (tTEB , tTEf ), while group 2 arrives in time
(tTEA , t
TE
B ).
Let us consider group 1. The increase in the value of ζ (denoted by ∆ζ) when group 1 arrives early
is given by:
∆ζ = β1(t
TE
A − tTE0 ) (B.4)
By Lemma 3, an increase in the value of ζ is the same while a group k is departing early as the
decrease in the value of ζ when the group k is departing late (k ∈ {1, 2}). Hence, considering the
case when group 1 arrives late:
∆ζ = γ1(t
TE
f − tTEB ) (B.5)
=⇒ β1(tTEA − tTE0 ) = γ1(tTEf − tTEB ) (B.6)
=⇒ tTEA − tTE0 = η
(
tTEf − tTEB
)
(B.7)
Since the departure rate is equal to the bottleneck capacity, using Equation (B.7), the number of
group 1 travelers departing early is η times the number of travelers departing late. Thus, η/(1 + η)
proportion of group 1 travelers depart early.
We can establish the same result by equating the ∆ζ for periods when group 2 travelers arrive early
and arrive late. Hence proved.
We can derive the values of transitions times as follows:
tTE0 = τ(t
TE
0 ) = τ
∗ − η
1 + η
N
D
(B.8)
tTEf = τ(t
TE
f ) = τ
∗ +
1
1 + η
N
D
(B.9)
tTEA = τ(t
TE
A ) = τ
∗ − η
η + 1
N2
D
(B.10)
tTEB = τ(t
TE
B ) = τ
∗ +
1
η + 1
N2
D
(B.11)
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